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Abstract
We study how nonlisted firms trade off financial, real, and distributive uses of cash. We
show that firms’ marginal value of cash (MVC) affects the mix of external and internal
finance used to absorb fluctuations in cash flows; in particular, high-MVC firms employ
substantially more external finance on the margin. Linking firms to their main bank,
we find that shocks to bank finance affect firms’ trade-offs and have real effects in high-
MVC firms, making investment more sensitive to firm cash flow. Our analysis suggests
that shocks to external financing costs are transmitted to the real economy via firms’
marginal value of cash.
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1 Introduction
How do external financing costs affect firms’ cash flow trade-offs? Firms trade off cash
flows from operating, financing, and distributive activities and these trade-offs are often
intertemporal in nature. For example, a firm that experiences a cash flow shortfall and
wants to shield its planned investment will have to increase external borrowing, draw on
previously saved cash balances, lower dividend payments, or a combination of all three.
Increasing borrowing may raise its future borrowing costs with repercussions for future
investment while a draw-down of cash reserves today will lower the amount of internal
finance available for future investments. The study of such trade-offs has recently become
an important topic in finance, see for example Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004),
Almeida and Campello (2007), Bakke and Whited (2008), Riddick and Whited (2009), and
Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey (2010).
In this paper, we study how external financing costs affect the cash flow trade-offs made
by nonlisted firms, using data that link a comprehensive sample of privately-held Norwegian
firms to their banks. Our objective is two-fold: First, we want to understand how nonlisted
firms typically trade off financial, real, and distributive allocations; that is, how do they
finance fluctuations in their cash flow. Little is known about corporate decision making
in closely-held firms which do not have access to public equity and debt markets. Second,
we study how shocks to the cost of external finance affect firms’ cash flow trade-offs—to
what extent do they substitute between external and internal finance and to what extent
do dividends and investments adjust? The firms in our sample are heavily dependent on
bank finance and our identifying assumption is that exogenous shocks to banks’ loan loss
provisions (measured as provisions to households and sectors other than that of the firm)
carry over to firms’ marginal cost of borrowing.
Almost all firms in our sample hold cash, have debt, and invest in physical capital
and in equilibrium the cost of using each source must be equalized; i.e. the marginal
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cost of borrowing (including shadow costs) must equal the marginal cost of drawing down
cash balances which again must equal the marginal value of investing in physical capital
(“marginal q”). We denote the common marginal cost/value as the marginal value of cash
(MVC) and frame much of our discussion in terms of the MVC—in the body of the paper,
we present a simple model which clarifies the interpretation.
In our empirical work we split the sample into firms that hold high and low balances
of cash and, alternatively, into firms that pay dividends and firms that do not. Our inter-
pretation is that firms with scant balances have a high marginal value of cash, and vice
versa. Similarly, firms that do not pay dividends have a high marginal value of cash which
exceeds the owners’ marginal utility of dividends. A high marginal value of cash may be
caused by “borrowing constraints” or it may be due to a high marginal product of capital.
As Riddick and Whited (2009) point out, a firm may accumulate only little cash because its
capital is so productive that it is optimal to dis-save today in order to invest and increase
cash flow tomorrow. Similarly, a firm may abstain from paying dividends today because
it is more productive to invest. The high-MVC firms in our sample, thus, do not neces-
sarily face tighter borrowing constraints than low-MVC firms in the form of a tighter loan
supply schedule—their borrowing costs may be higher simply because they have a higher
demand for loans. It is standard to interpret low dividend payout as a proxy for borrowing
constraints, however, the MVC-interpretation is more general in that borrowing constraints
imply that firms operate with a high MVC while the opposite need not hold. Sample splits
are typically endogenous to firm behavior but our firm-bank data allow us to identify the
effect of an exogenous tightening of credit from shocks to firms’ main bank.
Our main findings (elaborated on below) are that the trade-offs made by firms are
heavily dependent on their MVC and high-MVC firms are affected much more by bank shocks
than low-MVC firms. Our interpretation is that shocks to a firm’s main bank increase the
firm’s marginal cost of borrowing, and thereby the firm’s MVC, and this increase has stronger
real investment effects in firms that a priori have a higher MVC. The intuition is that firms
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with low-MVC have more financial slack and therefore investment will be less affected by
external financing shocks. These results also add to our understanding of how the bank
lending channel works in that our results suggest that firms’ MVC is part of the mechanism
though which credit shocks affect the real economy.
Firms operate subject to uncertain cash flows and must trade off sources and uses of
funds subject to the constraint that cash inflow must equal the total uses of cash as given by
the cash flow accounting identity.1 Because a firm’s financing, investment, and distribution
decisions are interlinked, examining individual decisions in isolation may fail to provide a
complete picture of the trade-offs it makes, as has been pointed out by Gatchev, Pulvino,
and Tarhan (2010). To understand how external financing costs affect cash flow trade-offs
we simultaneously consider the impact on all components of the cash flow identity.
We study the trade-offs made between a firm’s sources and uses of cash by estimating the
sensitivity of each component of the cash identity to its cash flows. As shown in Section 3,
these cash flow sensitivities reveal how costly it is for a firm to draw on its different sources of
funds in the face of a cash flow shortfall.2 The extent to which the firm substitutes between
different sources depends on how quickly the cost of using them changes. Therefore, it is
interesting to consider cash flow sensitivities—and not just levels—of deposits, loans, and
capital because the cash flow sensitivities contain information about the relative cost of
firms’ finance alternatives on the margin.
Our results show that, on average, firms save cash and repay bank loans in good times,
and borrow and dis-save in bad times. On the margin, however, they draw almost twice as
much on deposit balances than bank loans in the face of a cash flow shortfall; that is, firms’
1A fall in cash inflows must necessarily be financed by a reduction in one or more outflows. Disregarding
minor sources (empirically unimportant for our sample) a decrease in cash flows must be reflected in lower
dividend payments, larger draws on cash balances, increased net borrowing, or a drop in investment. A
similar reasoning applies to an increase in cash flows. Simply put, an increase in cash flows must be used
by adding it to cash balances, paying it out, or investing it.
2Because firms draw on a source up to the point where the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit,
the cash flow sensitivities equivalently reveal how much the marginal benefit of each use of cash decreases
with cash inflows.
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cash accumulation is more sensitive to cash flows than is their use of bank finance. The
average firm in our sample habitually uses both internal and external finance but relies more
on internal funding on the margin. This reflects that the marginal cost of internal funds
changes less rapidly than the cost of bank finance for the average firm—firms’ investment
and dividend payments also fluctuate pro-cyclically, but less so than cash accumulation.
Importantly, we include the lagged levels of loans, deposits, and capital stock in the
regressions and find very strong mean-reversion in the levels, that is, firms appear to revert
to an “optimal” (firm-specific) capital structure. For instance, if a firm enters the period
with a high level of bank debt, it repays part of that debt in the current period as opposed to
borrowing more. Some of the lagged level terms have large coefficients with t-statistics near
triple digits and ignoring these terms, as has been common in the literature, potentially
leads to left-out variable bias.
Internal funds is an important source of finance and, a priori, one would expect that
firms with little accumulated cash find it costly to adjust their cash balances as their cash
flow fluctuates and such firms have a high marginal value of cash.Similarly, firms that do no
pay dividends will have a high marginal value of cash. Sorting firms into groups according
to their MVC, we find striking cross-sectional differences: Firms that operate with a high
marginal value of cash (“high-MVC firms”) employ a financing mix that depends almost
five-fold more on bank finance on the margin. Low-MVC firms employ a marginal fixing mix
that depends eight-fold more on internal finance. That is, in cash rich firms, cash balances
fluctuate sharply because it is relatively costless to absorb fluctuations in cash flow by
changing deposit holdings. The opposite occurs in cash poor firms who absorb fluctuations
by borrowing and repaying bank credit. The higher cost of adjusting cash reserves for cash
poor firms has real implications—investment is relatively more sensitive to cash flows in
high-MVC firms.
We then consider how cash flow sensitivities are affected by exogenous shocks to a firm’s
main bank. We identify shocks to the bank as deviations from the average level of the bank’s
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loan loss provisions. Following bank shocks, high-MVC firms’ use of bank funding falls and
the cash flow sensitivity of bank finance also falls; that is, less of the firms’ cash flow
fluctuations are now absorbed by bank finance reflecting an upward shift in the marginal
cost of bank loans. As a consequence, the cash flow sensitivity of investment increases
significantly. There is little change in high-MVC firms’ use of internal cash balances after
bank shocks, suggesting that the marginal cost of drawing on cash is so high that firms
will not substitute internal for external finance. Low-MVC firms, operating with high cash
balances and hence a low marginal cost of cash are able to substitute internal for external
finance and do so to a large extent. Therefore, they are relatively insulated from changes
in external financing constraints and we do not observe any change in trade-offs made by
low-MVC firms following bank shocks.
In conclusion, we argue that standard cross-sectional sample splits on firm choice vari-
ables such as cash holdings or dividend payout are better interpreted as approximations to
differences in firms’ marginal value of cash. Indeed, we expect high-MVC firms to have a low
cash flow sensitivity of cash and a high cash flow sensitivity of external finance, and that
is exactly what we find. Our results suggest that the mechanism through which external
finance constraints are transferred to the real economy operates via firms’ marginal value
of cash.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our approach and
results in the light of related literature. Section 3 presents a simple model of firms’ decision
problem demonstrating that cash flow sensitivities have information about changes in the
marginal costs of components of the cash flow identity. Section 4 presents our empirical
methodology. Sections 5 and 6 present data and results and Section 7 concludes.
2 Relation to the existing literature
Almeida et al. (2004) direct attention towards the information contained in firms’ accumu-
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lation of cash balances. Cash may provide liquidity for investment when there is uncertainty
about how much external finance may be raised in the future. They analyze listed firms’
cash accumulation out of cash flow, which they coin the “cash flow-sensitivity of cash,”
and this is one of the cash flow sensitivities that we estimate. Our interpretation of MVC
is related to the value of holding cash in Almeida et al. (2004) although they, differently
from us, assume that some “unconstrained” firms can freely borrow and lend at a fixed safe
interest rate. In their model, credit constrained firms compensate by retaining more cash
and have a larger, positive, cash flow sensitivity compared to unconstrained firms, whose
cash flow sensitivity is indeterminate (insignificant).
One may be inclined to infer from Almeida et al. (2004) that a larger cash flow sensitivity
stems from a higher valuation of cash Our results show that this is not the case as we
estimate a smaller that would be characterized as more constrained using standard proxies
such as Because we argue that payout ratio is a better measure of the marginal value of
cash than of financial constraints, our interpretation of the smaller cash flow sensitivity
of cash is that firms that value cash higher are more reluctant to draw extensively on
their savings and prefer to absorb fluctuations in cash flows by drawing on sources with a
marginal cost that is less sensitive to the extent of their use. This reasoning is consistent
with the arguments presented in Riddick and Whited (2009) and Bakke and Whited (2008)
and supper their proposition that cash flow sensitivities do not reveal the extent to which
firms are financially constrained.
Other papers focus on the level of cash balances and find that firms with relatively
poorer access to external finance tend to hold larger buffer-stocks of cash.3 Many of these
papers tend to address the question from the point of view of large widely-held corporations,
partly due to availability of data and we believe ours is the first paper to analyze how small
firms trade off the accumulation of cash against other uses of cash flow.4
3See, for example, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), Acharya, Almeida, and Campello
(2007), Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), and Mao and Tserlukevic (2009).
4Faulkender (2002) examines determinants of the level of cash holdings of small firms in the National
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Financial flexibility may also be provided by lines of credit. Sufi (2007) shows that firms
with access to a line of credit display a higher cash flow sensitivity of cash and Campello
et al. (2010) study firms’ use of lines of credit during the 2008 financial crisis. As we do,
they focus on how companies substitute between internal and external liquidity and real
investment in the face of a shock to external finance. Although they do not consider the
marginal value of cash in their analysis they find, consistent with our results, that cash-rich
firms draw less extensively on lines of credit.
External financing costs may have real effects on investment. Initiated by Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), a large literature finds a larger sensitivity of investment to
cash flow for firms that are more likely to be credit constrained.5 We follow the approach of
many papers in this literature by comparing subsamples of firms and estimating differential
cross-sectional implications of external finance costs.6 The investment-cash flow sensitivity
is, of course, another of the sensitivities from the cash flow identity that we consider in
this paper. The investment-cash flow sensitivity idea builds on the notion that financial
frictions cause a wedge between the cost of external and internal finance but does not
explicitly include a motive for firms’ accumulating of cash balances, but assumes that the
marginal value of internally generated cash is equal to a fixed safe interest rate.7 In contrast,
our analysis incorporates the decision to accumulate cash assumes that cash holdings are
the outcome of a dynamic optimization problem that trades off all current and future uses
and sources of funds.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature arguing that shifts in bank lending policies
Survey of Small Business Finance and documents, as found for listed firms, that firms facing greater uncer-
tainty regarding their ability to raise finance in the future tend to hold larger buffer stocks of cash. Brav
(2009) examines capital structure determinants in U.K. privately-held firms and finds, among others, that
leverage is relatively more sensitive to operating performance (cash flow) compared to listed firms that have
easier access to external finance. Although the firms in his sample are much larger than ours (about 10
times), this result is similar to our findings that high-MVC firms use external financial more intensively.
5Later contributions include Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) who
questions the interpretation of the sensitivities estimated in Fazzari et al. (1988).
6E.g. Fazzari et al. (1988) split on dividend-payout ratios, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) split on firm size,
and Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) split their sample on whether firms issue public bonds or not.
7A closely related literature is the business cycle models of the so-called financial accelerator; e.g.,
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996).
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have real effects because some borrowers are bank dependent and cannot substitute other
finance for bank loans (the “bank lending channel”).8 We add to that literature by studying
how bank shocks affect corporate trade-offs, thereby identifying a mechanism for how bank
shocks are transmitted to the real economy.
3 A simple model of cash management trade-offs
In this section, we present a model that captures the intertemporal nature of firm’s trade-
offs between different uses and sources of cash. We present a simple deterministic infinite
horizon model and we believe that the logic will carry over to more complex setups with
uncertainty, as outlined at the end of the section. The model has two main results: First,
we show that in optimum firms operate where the marginal shadow value of cash equals
the marginal shadow costs of each item in the cash identity; i.e., at the point where all
marginal costs and benefits are equalized. Second, the model provides expressions for
the cash flow sensitivities of each items in the cash identity and illustrates how they are
inversely related to the slope of their marginal cost/benefit curve. That is, the model
illustrates mathematically how our estimated cash flow sensitivities uncover how quickly
the marginal cost of a source of finance changes as the firm draws on it.
Consider a firm whose owner maximizes the discounted sum of future dividends. We
denote the maximized value by Vt:
Vt = max Σ
∞
t=0 β
t U(DIVt) ,
where the maximum is taken with respect to decision variables and constraints to be spelled
out, β a discount factor, U a concave utility function, and DIVt is period t dividends.
We assume that cash flow (EBITDA) is determined from an increasing concave production
8A non-exhaustive list of contributions include Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Bernanke and Lown (1991),
Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993), Peek and Rosengren (2000), Ashcraft (2005), and Jime´nez, Ongena,
Peydro´-Alcalde, and Saurina (2010).
8
function which delivers output f(Kt−1) where Kt is physical capital at the end of period t.
The production function f is increasing, concave, and differentiable with a law of motion
Kt = Kt−1 + It where It is investment during period t (depreciation is ignored for simpler
notation). Dividends equal cash flow minus interest paid plus increases in outstanding
loans minus increases in deposits minus gross investments. We denote the stock of loans
and deposits at the end of period t by Lt and DEPt, respectively.
The loan interest rate rb(Lt), paid at the beginning of period t+ 1, is a positive convex
increasing function of the amount of loans outstanding. The return on deposits is com-
prised of a constant deposit rate of interest, rd, plus a “shadow interest rate,” captured
by a differentiable, convex function s(DEPt). The shadow value of cash is a simple way of
capturing that firms hold cash to insure against future states with low cash flows where
external finance is limited or costly. The positive effect on firm value from accumulated
cash stems, among others, from the positive net present value of investment projects that
would otherwise not have been undertaken—the mechanism modeled by Almeida et al.
(2004).9 Alternatively, as in the model of Riddick and Whited (2009), the shadow value of
cash stems from a fixed cost of raising outside finance. For our purposes it is convenient to
capture these features by assuming that cash delivers a direct valuable service—the overall
monetary return to holding cash is then rd + s(DEPt).
All variables are chosen simultaneously, but in an accounting sense we can write divi-
dends as a residual from the simplified cash flow identity:
DIVt = f(Kt−1)−∆DEPt + DEPt−1rd + s(DEPt−1) + ∆Lt − Lt−1rb(Lt−1)− It .
We derive Euler equations for deposits, loans, and real capital—see Cochrane (2005), p.
5, for a similar derivation of the general Euler equation. Starting from values that are
9In their three-period model, firms may hoard cash in period one to invest in a “short-term” project in
the interim period, and the marginal value of cash is the marginal return to that investment, realized in the
final period.
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optimally chosen, the Euler equations are derived from permutations of the optimal choice
variables. The firm’s owner can decide to lower current dividends by a fraction (“one
dollar”) which decreases current utility by U ′(DIV), deposit the cash and in the next period
take out the one dollar plus the interest to be used for dividends next period. This would
increase next period’s utility by U ′(DIVt+1)(1 + rd + s′). At the optimum the owner will
be indifferent to this permutation and therefore the marginal utility of receiving dividends
today will equal the discounted marginal utility times the gross return from postponing
dividends one period, which provides the Euler equation:
U ′(DIVt) = βU′(DIVt+1)(1 + rd + s′(DEPt)) .
Alternatively, the owner may decrease dividends, repay loans, and increase dividends the
following period by the same amount plus saved interest, leading to the Euler equation for
loans:
U ′(DIVt) = βU′(DIVt+1)(1 + rbt + Lt
drb
dL
) .
Similarly, we can derive the standard Euler equation for investment:
U ′(DIVt) = βU′(DIVt+1)(1 + f ′(Kt)) .
Equating the right-hand side of those Euler equations and denoting the marginal value of
cash, βU ′(DIVt+1)(1 + rd + s′(DEPt)), by MVCt, we have in optimum that the marginal value
of cash equals the marginal value or cost of other uses of funds in the cash flow identity
MVCt ≡ βU ′(DIVt+1)(1 + rd + s′t) = βU′(DIVt+1)(1 + rb + Lt
drb
dL
)
= βU ′(DIVt+1)(1 + f ′(Kt)) = U′(DIVt) . (1)
In words, the marginal value of cash equals the marginal cost of borrowing equals the
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marginal value of physical capital equals the marginal value of dividend pay-outs.
We can derive cash flow sensitivities from this identity. If we write (1) as
rd + s′(DEPt) = rbt + Lt
drb
dL
= f ′(Kt) =
U′(DIVt)
βU′(DIVt+1)
− 1 (2)
and linearize using a simple first order Taylor series expansion we obtain expressions for
the cash flow sensitivities as detailed in Appendix B. The solutions are (with all functions
except utility evaluated at period t values):
∆DIVt =
1
1 + U′′t /(βU′t+1s′′) + U′′t /(βU′t+12rb
′
) + U′′t /(βU′t+1f ′′)
CFt ,
∆DEPt =
1
βU′t+1 s′′/U′′t + 1 + s′′/2rb
′
+ s′′/f ′′
CFt ,
∆Lt =
1
βU′t+1 2rb
′
/U′′t + 2rb
′
/s′′ + 1 + 2rb′/f ′′
CFt ,
It =
1
βU′t+1 f ′′/U′′t + f ′′/s′′ + f ′′/2rb
′
+ 1
CFt .
The intuition of the cash flow sensitivity of cash is the same as formula (5) of Almeida
et al. (2004). In their model, cash is hoarded in period t for the purpose of investing in
a short-term production function in period t + 1 and their cash flow sensitivity of cash
depends on the second derivative of a short-term production function relative to the second
derivative of a long-term production function.
In our sample, several firms do not pay dividend and the derivations above ignore the
non-negativity constraints on dividends—we outline the first order conditions for this case
in Appendix B. It is clear that dividends will be zero in period t if U ′(0) < MVCt.
In Figure 1, we illustrate the optimal allocation for deposits, loans, and physical invest-
ment for a cash-rich, low-MVC firm, and a cash-poor, high-MVC firm, with identical utility,
cost, and production functions. At the outset, time t, the marginal values are equalized.
A negative cash flow shock at date t+ 1 causes re-optimization to a higher MVC level. The
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figure illustrates the interpretation of the cash flow sensitivities; in particular, it shows how
the steepness of the MVC-curve affects the magnitude of the adjustments in deposits, loans,
and investment to the new equilibrium. The cash-rich firm operates where the shadow
value of cash changes slowly (s′′ is small in absolute value) and therefore a large fraction
of the firm’s cash flow fluctuations will be absorbed by an adjustment in deposits. The
curves are drawn such that the same holds for investments, while loans react less.10 The
cash-poor firm, in contrast, operates on a relatively steep segment of the MVC-curve and
absorbs relatively less of its cash flow fluctuations through deposits, such that loans may
react relative more.
While we do not intend to parameterize and solve the model under our simplifying
assumptions, one might solve the model by iterating over the Bellman equation
V (DEPt−1, Lt−1,Kt−1) = maxIt,∆DEPt,∆LtU(f(Kt−1)−∆DEPt + DEPt−1rd + ∆Lt
−Lt−1rb(Lt−1)− It) + βV(DEPt, Lt,Kt) ,
subject to the law of motions of our model.
A more extensive model, see for example Riddick and Whited (2009), would have cash
flows subject to stochastic shocks f(Kt−1, 
p
t ) where 
p is a stochastic shock to productivity
(potentially correlated over time), costs of adjusting capital, and non-negativity constraints
on dividends and deposits, as well as potential constraints on future borrowing—capturing
the intuition of Almeida et al. (2004). Under suitable concavity and compactness assump-
tions, the value of the firm, V , will be a concave differentiable (away from corners) function
which satisfies the Bellman equation
V (DEPt−1, Lt−1,Kt−1) = maxIt,∆DEPt,∆LtU(DIVt) + βE0V(DEPt,Lt,Kt) ,
10Figure 1 may have a slope that is too steep for low amounts of loans but the same result would hold
if a fraction of firms adjusted loans significantly while another fraction of firms didn’t adjust loans at all
because they were at the zero lower limit.
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where DIVt is f(Kt−1, 
p
t )−∆DEPt + DEPt−1rd + ∆Lt − Lt−1rb(Lt−1)− It (DIVt may be zero)
and E0 is the expectation conditional on period zero information. In such a more general
framework, the marginal trade-offs still hold and in the case of non-binding constraints, we
would have (among other first order conditions):
MVCt = βE0{∂V(DEPt, Lt,Kt)
∂DEP
(1 + rd)} ,
where the value function captures the future expected benefits of holding cash. Riddick
and Whited (2009) display such first order conditions for the shadow value of cash balances
but in their model V can only be solved by simulation.
4 Empirical methodology
Consider the accounting identity for cash flows. We start by defining symbols for the
elements of the cash identity and all variables are signed such that positive values indicate
uses of cash, such as depositing cash in a bank account, investing in equipment, or repaying
loans. Define cash flows (EBITDA) as earnings before taxes, depreciation, and amortization,
DIV as dividends paid to owners, DEP as net increase in deposits in financial institutions,
LOANS as net repayment on loans (net of new borrowing), TRADECRED as net repayment
of trade credit, TRADEDEB as net granting of credit to customers, SECBOUGHT as securities
purchased, EQUITY as equity retired, INTPAID as net payments of interest, INV as gross
investment in fixed capital and inventories and TAXPAID as taxes paid. Given a dollar of
cash inflow, firms can pay out dividends or invest in capital, they typically are obligated to
pay (or receive) interest and pay taxes, and they normally grant trade credit to customers
as part of routine business transactions. For our firms, purchases of securities and changes
in firms’ equity are small and we include these terms here for completeness but ignore
them in the empirical work. Finally, firms can add to cash holdings, repay (bank) loans, or
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postpone payments for goods delivered; i.e., borrow from suppliers.
In symbols, the (approximate) cash identity is:
EBITDA = DIV + DEP + LOANS + TRADECRED +INV +
TRADEDEB + TAXPAID + INTPAID + SECBOUGHT + EQUITY . (3)
Equation (3) is the starting point for our empirical analysis. Empirically, we estimate
how an extra dollar of cash flows (EBITDA) is allocated to each of the terms in the cash
identity. We estimate panel Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions
(Yit − Yi.) = νt + β (EBITDAit − EBITDAi.) + lags + it , (4)
where the index i refers to firm i and index t refers to year t. νt is a dummy variable for
each time period. The variable Y is generic and represents an element of the cash flow
identity, such as deposits or net loans repayments.
“Lags” refers to lagged variables. Gatchev et al. (2010) show that including lagged
variables have important effects on the estimated parameters which likely display left-out
variable bias in a static specification. In the literature on optimal capital structure the
change in loans to assets are typically regressed on explanatory variables and the lagged
level in order to allow for mean reversion.11 Similarly, Opler et al. (1999) find that the
majority of firms display mean reversion in cash to asset ratios. We, therefore, do not
follow Gatchev et al. (2010), who include the lagged flows (the Y s) in the regression—a
specification which imply that firms have a target level for cash flows rather than for the
levels of deposits, loans, capital, etc.12 We include the lagged stock of deposits, loans,
11See, among others, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Baker and Wurgler (2002), and Fama and French
(2002). Relatedly, Graham and Harvey (2001) find, using questionnaires, that most CEOs aim for a target
level of debt to equity.
12The specification of Gatchev et al. (2010) is suitable if the level variables are non-stationary. In our
specification, non-stationarity of the level variables is a special case where a coefficient of the lagged level
near unity indicates non-stationarity.
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trade credit, accounts payable, and physical capital and, as shown below, find strong mean
reversion in the stock levels.
We further include lagged EBITDA based on initial explorations: Physical investments
take time to implement and we find that, indeed, investment reacts to cash flows with a lag.
We control for firm fixed effects by subtracting the average of the variables for each firm,
indicated by EBITDAi., because we wish to study how; e.g., the accumulation of cash reacts
to cash inflows relative to the firm average, and not cross-sectional differences between
firms. (We don’t use the standard dummy variable notation because interaction terms,
introduced below, act on the variables after removing firm averages.)
The variables are all measured in millions of Norwegian kroner and a coefficient β of,
say, 0.25, implies that out of a cash flow of a one hundred kroner in firm i at time t, 25
kroner are paid out on cash flow component Y on average. More precisely, these numbers
are deviations from firm- and year-averages.
We estimate equation (4) with each component of the cash identity taking the place of
the generic Y variable and if the cash identity holds in the data, the β-coefficients will sum
to unity.13 We present the β-coefficients multiplied by 100 and each coefficient then has
the interpretation as the percent of EBITDA allocated to the relevant component. In other
words, we provide at decomposition of a typical firm’s EBITDA-shock into its components
of use. In most of our work we focus on dividends, deposits, net loan repayment, net trade
credit repayment, and gross investment. The other components are negligible for the firms
in our sample (except for accounts payable).
In order to examine the effect of bank shocks on the decomposition of cash flows, we
allow the coefficient β to change with shocks to loans-loss provisions (which we denote
PROV) in the main bank of firm i. We specify the coefficient βit as
13The equations all have the same right-hand side regressors and form a so-called Seemingly Unrelated
Regression (SURE). It is well known that system estimation provides estimates identical to equation-by-
equation OLS estimates for SURE systems.
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βit = β0 + β1 Xit (5)
where Xit ≡ (PROVjt − PROVj. − PROV.t) is a measure of the shock to firm i’s main bank
j at date t. (The term PROV.t is the average across all banks rather than across firms.)
The intuition is that firm i’s main bank may tighten lending and/or increase costs if it
experiences larger-than-average (over time and over banks in year t) loan loss provisions in
a given year .
We estimate regressions with interactions between EBITDAit and Xit of the following
basic form,
(Yit − Yi.) = νt + βit (EBITDAit − EBITDAi.) + γ(Xit − Xi.) + lags + it . (6)
We allow for interactions between EBITDAi,t−1 and Xi,t−1 as well, because firms may adjust
to bank shocks over more than over period.
The coefficient β1 is the interaction effect and an estimated value larger than aero implies
that a larger share of cash flows are allocated to Y on average when X is large (relative to
firm- and overall means). In other words, the cash flow sensitivity of Y increases when firm
i’s main bank makes above-average loan loss provisions.
Our regressions do not include a measure of Tobin’s q, as is customary in the investment-
cash flow sensitivity literature. Several papers; e.g., Riddick and Whited (2009), have
pointed out the difficulties of measuring Tobin’s q and measurement error is likely to be an
even larger problem in our sample of non-listed firms. The estimated cash flow sensitivi-
ties depend on a variety of factors, such as external financing constraints and investment
productivity, that are extremely difficult to control adequately for in a regression. Our
identification strategy is therefore a different one: The effect of external financing con-
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straints are revealed through the interaction effect which captures the changes in estimated
sensitivities when firms’ main bank receives an exogenous shock and tightens lending.
4.1 Instrumental variables
One may question the causality of the interaction effect in equation (6). That is, it is possible
that the interacted cash flow sensitivities are caused by financial difficulties of firms in our
sample—such firms may trade off sources of funds differently and their financial difficulties
might show up as delinquencies and subsequent loan loss provisions at their main banks.
Hence, it is possible that a significant interaction term does not reflect an exogenous change
in banks’ loan supply, but rather that distraught firms behave differently.
It is unlikely that such reverse causality is a problem in our regressions because, on
average, a firm’s outstanding loans constitute only 0.043 percent of their main bank’s out-
standing loans and leases. As we show below (Table 6), the loans to all the firms in the
sample make up less than 5 percent of their main bank’s loan portfolio, that is, the banks in
our sample have many borrowers that are not included in the sample. The banks’ loan loss
provisions are therefore unlikely to be caused by delinquencies of the firms in our sample.
Further, the banks have many other, larger, loan engagements with corporations that are
not included in the sample.14
Nevertheless, we perform instrumental variables (IV) regressions to validate our in-
terpretation. We construct instruments from three variables related to banks’ loan loss
provisions: (1) specified provisions against loan losses in the household sector in percent of
firm i’s main bank j’s loan portfolio; (2) the fraction of delinquent loans in the household
and foreign sector, in percent of firm i’s main bank j’s loan portfolio; and (3) commercial
and industrial loan loss reserves held by firm i’s main bank j against firms in industries
other than firm i’s industry. Norwegian banks do not report loan loss provisions (flow) by
industry but they report loan loss reserves (stock) by industry. We may therefore proxy
14As we explain in Section 5, we exclude firms that belong to a business group from the sample.
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provisions in industry k in year t by the change in loan loss reserves from year t − 1 to
year t. Such changes will be correlated with the bank’s overall loss provisions, but not with
idiosyncratic shocks to firm i’s cash flow.15 By similar reasoning, we compute the change in
the stock of delinquent loans in the household and foreign sector as a proxy for provisions in
those sectors. We retain the (scaled) level of reserves and delinquent loans as instruments,
although most power comes from the changes in these variables.
5 Data
Our sample consists of Norwegian limited liability firms operating in Norway between 1995
and 2005. All Norwegian limited liabilities firms must annually report audited balance sheet
and income and loss statements to the Company Register, the Brønnøysund Register.16
Norwegian law requires that accounts be audited, irrespective of company size which ensures
high quality data even for small and medium size firms.17
From the population of all limited liabilities firms we exclude firms which are subsidiaries
of larger corporations such that our sample is comprised of independent firms that are not
members of business groups. Because business groups may transfer resources between
member firms, thus counteracting credit constraints imposed on individual members, we
prefer to focus on independent firms in order to aid identification of the mechanism with
which bank loan supply shocks are transmitted to the real economy. Also, subsidiaries do
not have full autonomy with regards to financial management decisions. We also exclude
public (listed) firms and firms whose main owner is the Norwegian state or a foreign firm.
Finally, we exclude firms from the following industries: Finance and insurance; professional,
15We set negative changes in loan loss reserves to zero. The change in reserves may be negative in
years where banks write off large amounts of loans from their balance sheet. Such write-offs are related to
provisions made in the past and are unlikely to affect the current loan policy of the banks. Therefore, we
prefer to set negative values to zero.
16This data is made available to us through the Center for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) at
the Norwegian School of Management.
17The failure to submit audited accounts within a specified deadline automatically results in the initiation
of a process that may end with the enforced liquidation of the firm.
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scientific, and technical services; public administration, educational services; health care
and social assistance; other services; and ocean transportation.
Some firms-years have missing information on location, industry, and/or establishment
year. Missing values are filled where possible, by checking consistency with industry and
establishment years before and after the missing entry. Firms with negative assets and
sales, firms of average size less than 1 million Norwegian kroner (approx. 167,000 USD),
and firms where the difference between reported total assets and liabilities exceeds 1 million
kroner are excluded. We are interested in studying the reaction of variation in the time
series of firms’ cash flow; hence, we exclude firms whose organization number is missing
from the sample in one or more years between the first and the last year they appear in the
sample. Finally, we exclude firms for which we observe less than three consecutive years
of data leaving us with 119,682 firm-year observations and 23,057 individual firms. Sixty
percent of the firms appear in all eleven years of the sample.
We match the sample of independent firms with annual data for outstanding loans and
deposits in financial institutions. The data (“tax data”) is made available to us by the
Norwegian Tax Administration. It specifies each deposit and loan relationship that a given
firm has with any loan-giving institution in Norway. This allows us to match up individual
firms and loan-giving institutions. In those cases where such institutions are banks, we can
merge the sample further with data on Norwegian banks’ financial accounts (Norwegian
call reports) made available to us by the Central Bank of Norway and Statistics Norway.
5.1 Construction and data source of main variables
The construction of the variables in the cash flow identity is as follows: From the tax
data, we construct a firm’s accumulation of cash as the increase in its outstanding deposits
aggregated over all deposit-giving institutions with which it has a deposit account. The
repayment of loans (net of new borrowing) is the decrease in outstanding loans aggregated
over all loan-giving institutions. Net interest paid is the difference between annual interest
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paid and received, summed over all institutions.18
The remaining variables in the cash flow identity are from firms’ annual accounts.
EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. The repayment
of trade credit (net of new borrowing) is the decrease in accounts payable between two
consecutive years. Extension of trade credit (net of repayments) is the increase in accounts
receivable between years. Capital stock is the value of fixed assets and inventories and gross
investment is the change in the capital stock plus depreciation. Accrued taxes is reported
accounting taxes and reduction in paid-in equity is the net reduction in share capital; i.e.,
the cash outflow due to write-downs. All firm-level variables are scaled by the average firm
size (total assets averaged over all years with observations for the firm) and winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentile. All data are further scaled by the consumer price index
normalized to unity in 1998.
Bank-level variables are constructed from Norwegian call reports. Loan loss provisions
comprise gross provisions made on loans, leases, and guarantees.19 Provisions comprise
so-called “specified” and “unspecified” provisions where the former is provisions against
delinquent engagements of three months or longer. Norwegian law requires that banks com-
pute loss assessments and set aside reserves for such loans. The latter type of provisions
may not be tied to individual engagements but are of a general nature and likely to con-
tain forward-looking information about expected, but not yet realized, delinquencies. The
instruments for loan loss provisions are constructed as follows: Specified provisions against
loans/leases/guarantees to households is a subset of specified provisions as described above.
Delinquent loans in the household and foreign sector is the value of all loans and leases ex-
tended to customers that are in delinquency on one or more engagements. We define
18Although firms in our data set may borrow from non-financial institutions and non-banks, almost all
borrowing is from savings or commercial banks. If we substitute loan from all lenders with bank loans in
our regressions, it makes little difference to the results.
19Gross provisions are new provisions on engagements for which provisions have not previously been made,
plus increased provisions on engagements for which provisions have been made previously, minus reductions
in previously made provisions. The measure does not include realized losses on engagements.
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delinquent loans as those where payments are at least 30 days behind schedule. Loan loss
reserves is the stock of reserves held on the balance sheet against loan/leases/guarantees.
Annual changes in loan loss reserves include realized losses on engagements for which pro-
visions were previously made. All bank level variables are scaled by the value of the bank’s
loans and leases at the end of the previous period (the size of its loan portfolio) and are
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.
We construct a bank shock measure from banks’ loan loss provisions, by demeaning
gross provisions in year t with the bank’s average level of provisions during the sample.
Higher-than-average provisions thus constitutes a negative shock to a bank. A firm’s main
bank is defined as the bank with which it has the largest outstanding amount of loans in
a given year. Only a very small fraction of firms change main bank during the sample. In
each year, the firm is paired up with it’s main banks and the credit shock to a firm in a
given year, is the demeaned level of loan loss provisions at its main bank in that year.
5.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports key ratios from the firms’ balance sheet and income statements. The
firms are on average 11 years of age and the main owner holds a controlling stake of
65 percent. The distribution of assets, and most other variables, is clearly right-skewed.
Average turnover is about twice the size of total assets. Fixed assets make up 37 percent
of assets and cash holdings, in the form of deposits, 14 percent. Accounts receivable make
up 20 percent. On the capital side, equity constitutes 16 percent of assets and the liability-
to-asset ratio is high at 84 percent. Part of the explanation for this ratio is the Norwegian
value-added tax of 25 percent which accumulates as a liability on firm’s balance sheets
and constitutes 14 percent of short term liabilities on average (not reported in Table 1).
In addition, liabilities include loans from shareholders and other private lenders. Unpaid
salaries and unpaid reserves for vacation pay account for 22 and 54 percent of short and long-
term liabilities, respectively (not reported in Table 1). Bank debt is the largest financial
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debt item at 28 percent followed by trade credit at 21 percent. Return on assets is 6 percent
and the firms pay out 39 percent of net income as dividends, suggesting that dividends is
an important source of income for the owners of these firms.
The industry distribution of the firms is a follows: The largest group is wholesale
and retail firms which constitutes 45 percent of the firms in the sample followed by 21
percent of firms in construction and 16 percent in manufacturing. Approximately 6 percent
of the firms operate in each of the following sectors: Accommodation and Food Services,
Transportation and Warehousing, and Agriculture. Firms operating in the Mining, Utilities,
and Information (telecommunication) sectors constitute approximately one percent of the
firms in our sample.
Table 2 compares our sample to the 2003 U.S. Survey of Small Business Finance
(SSBF)—both a sample of S-corporations and the larger C-corporations.20 As we have
eliminated firms that belong to a business group from our sample, our firms are, not sur-
prisingly, small compared to the SSBF-firms with median assets at approximately 0.7 million
USD compared to assets of 2.5 and 3.7 million USD for S and C-corporations, respectively.
Further, the Norwegian firms operate with substantially lower equity ratios. A large part
of this difference in capital-structure can presumably be explained by structural (esp. tax)
differences between the two countries. Focusing on the medians and comparing chiefly
to the smaller S-corporations, we see that the Norwegian firms tend to have more debt,
in particular bank debt, but also substantially more trade credit. The median age is 7
years, substantially less than median age of the U.S. samples which may be due to firms
in business groups being eliminated. The median share held by the largest owner is 62 for
our sample and 70 percent for U.S. S-corporations. In general, we notice that the higher
standard deviations in the U.S. samples indicate more heterogeneity in the SSBF.
20S-Corporations must have no more than 100 shareholders and are taxed as partnerships, that is, at the
level of the shareholders. C-corporations are limited liability firms.
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6 Regression results
6.1 Cash flow decomposition
We start by estimating the cash flow sensitivities of each component of the cash flow
identity. The first line of Table 3 gives the coefficient on contemporary EBITDA and shows
how a one-hundred dollar increase in cash flow (EBITDA) is allocated to different uses—
alternatively, how a one-dollar shortfall may be funded from different sources. Standard
errors are estimated robustly with clustering at the firm level. In general, the t-statistics are
so large—for instance, about 100 for dividends—that we do not comment on significance
for this table.21
Firms cover a cash flow shortfall by lowering dividends, drawing on accumulated deposits
or bank loans, giving less trade credit and, to a lesser extent, decreasing investment. The
sum of these five items indicate that they finance 84 percent of the shortfall. Dividends
and deposits react strongly to cash flows with 20 percent of (above average) cash flows
being paid out as dividends and 24 percent deposited and similar declines when cash flows
fall short of average. Repayment of bank loans (net of new borrowing) in good times, and
borrowing in bad times, amounts to about 13 percent of cash flows while repayment of trade
credit does not depend on whether firms have high or low cash flows. This likely reflects
that trade credit is an expensive source of finance on the margin, with high penalty rates
when payments are not made within the standard deadlines. In contrast, firms extend
trade credit when their cash flows are high and tighten up when cash flows are low.22
Hence, the average firm does not use trade credit to cover a shortfall—the estimated cash
flow sensitivity is less than 1 percent. This insensitivity, however, hides cross-sectional
differences as our subsequent analysis will show.
An additional 19.62 percent of cash flow variations is covered by accrued taxes. The
21The estimated coefficients have all been multiplied by 100 to allow interpretation in percentage terms.
22Notice, that because we estimate sensitivity to firm’s idiosyncratic cash flow, the cyclical extension of
trade credit is not necessarily mirrored the use of trade credit, even if our sample contained the entire
population of firms.
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remaining items, interest paid, increased securities holdings, and paid-in equity are of negli-
gible importance and we disregard these in further analysis. Clearly, small firms accumulate
cash but not securities and, as expected, equity is not issued much by this type of firms.
We also disregard accrued taxes in our analysis because we cannot observe actually paid
taxes. Accrued taxes reflect accounting taxes and this variable has little information about
firms’ ability to delay tax payment as a source of finance. The estimated coefficients sum
up to 104.22 despite the fact that we do not constrain the estimated cash flow sensitivities
to add to one. In the data, the cash flow identity is far from satisfied when we consider the
levels of the items, but the sum of the estimated cash sensitivities is close to unity and we
therefore do not display results that impose the adding-up constraint.
It is obvious from our results that, on the margin, the average firm’s financing mix is
biased towards internal funds in that it draws mainly on internal funds (including dividends)
to absorb cash flow fluctuations. As discussed in Section 3, the sensitivity to cash flow
reflects how quickly the marginal cost of each source of funds changes as the firm draws
on it. Our results therefore reveal that the average firm operates with a steeper marginal
cost-curve for external than for internal funds.
Dividends may be an important source of income to the owners of the firms in our
sample as the firms are closely held and owners’ wealth not necessarily very diversified. If
owners were highly diversified, one would expect the marginal utility of dividends to be
roughly constant. Our results suggest that the shadow marginal value of dividends changes
at a somewhat higher rate than the marginal value of cash but still at a considerably lower
rate than that of external finance. Our results therefore are consistent with dividends being
an important, but not the sole, source of income for owners.
We include lagged cash flows as a regressor to account for potential dynamic effects.
Table 3 shows that the investment sensitivity to lagged cash flows is actually larger than
the contemporaneous one, implying that investment reacts to cash flows with a lag. This
likely reflects that investment takes time and if one focuses only on the current investment-
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cash flow sensitivity, a large part of investment is missed and the relation between cash
flows and real investment may be severely underestimated. The lagged sensitivities of the
remaining coefficients are small compared to the contemporaneous estimates, except for
loan repayments, where net borrowing increases in response to last year’s EBITDA. Hence,
higher cash flow today leads firms to repay loans faster but the subsequent year they repay
less, likely in order to finance the increase in investment.
Table 3 has interesting predictions for the capital structure of firms. Firms with high
levels of deposits (relative to the firm average) drastically decrease cash savings. The point
estimate implies that 100 dollars more in deposits is associated with 70 dollars less de-
posits in the following period. A 100 dollars of lagged deposits is also associated with
significantly higher dividends (6 dollars), higher granting of trade credit (10 dollars), and
more investment (14 dollars). Of course, these numbers should not be given a causal in-
terpretation; in particular, firms will accumulate cash for the purpose of financing planned
investment. Firms with high levels of outstanding bank loans (100 dollars higher) repay
loans (51 dollars) and lower dividends (5 dollars), deposits (4 dollars), trade credit (4 dol-
lars), and investments (3 dollars). Outstanding trade credit is paid off as soon as possible
as indicated by the coefficient to the lagged level of 73 and high trade credit leads to lower
dividends, deposits, loan repayments, and investments in the 5-10 dollars range per 100
dollars outstanding. Accounts receivable is almost as strongly mean reverting as accounts
payable and a high level of accounts receivable predicts higher investments, deposits, loans
(marginally), and investments, but a lower extension of further trade credit.23 A relatively
large capital stock affects the allocation of cash the following period with 100 dollars more
of physical capital predicting 26 dollars less of investment and around 5 dollars more of divi-
dends, deposits, and extension trade credit, while associated with 5 dollars lower repayment
of trade credit and 13 dollars less repayment of loans. The latter negative numbers may re-
23One might conjecture that a high level of accounts payable partly is associated with a temporarily high
level of goods turnover, in which case accounts receivable might also be temporarily high.
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flect that physical investment is associated with a larger scale of operations. Whatever the
reason may be is not the focus here, but it is clear that the coefficients of the lagged stocks
are large—albeit numerically less than unity, consistent with mean reversion—implying a
large potential for left-out variable bias in the coefficients of interest if the lagged levels are
not included.
6.2 Firms with high vs. low marginal costs of cash
We split the sample into firms with high versus low marginal value of cash using two
measures that a priori would seem to proxy that value well: The level of deposit holdings
and firms’ dividend payments (both scaled by average firm size).
We first compute various descriptive statistics for these subgroups of firms, displayed
in Table 4. Considering the splits by cash holdings and dividends, the difference between
the high- and low-MVC groups are quite similar in the two splits. Firms with high cash
holdings pay higher dividends and firms that pay higher dividends hold more cash. High-
MVC firms also operate with higher levels of external finance, both in terms of bank loans
and trade credit and high-MVC firms have more physical capital. They tend to grow less
rapidly, although investment levels are about the same as for low-MVC firms (higher in the
split by cash holdings, lower in the split by dividends). Clearly high-MVC firms have been
able to borrow and they may therefore face a high marginal cost of lending as sketched
in Figure 1. However, it does not necessarily follow that, for a given level of lending,
these firms face higher borrowing costs and we, therefore, avoid referring to those firms as
“financially constrained.”
Next, we run the cash flow sensitivity regressions for high- and low-MVC firms separately
and we display the estimated coefficients to current and lagged cash flows in Table 5.
(Lagged levels are included in the regressions but the estimated coefficients not displayed.)
We indicate coefficients that are significant at the 5 percent level by showing them in bold
font, while we use stars to indicate whether coefficients are significantly different between
26
high- and low-MVC firms. The results reveal strong differences in financing choices between
high- and low-MVC firms. Splitting by average cash holdings, the estimated cash flow
sensitivities in Table 5 show that high-MVC firms pay out (about) 12 dollars in dividends
(for average current cash flows 100 dollars above average) while low-MVC firm pay out 28
dollars in dividends consistent with the argument that cash has lower value within the
firm. Investments are more cash-flow sensitive for high-MVC firms with significance at the
5 percent level. High-MVC firms draw almost 6 times as much on external (loans and
trade-credit) than internal finance, whereas low-MVC firms draw 35-times more on internal
finance.24 Considering the ratio of bank finance to deposits saved, the ratio is five in the
case of high-MVC banks, and 0.12 in the case of low-MVC firm; i.e., the latter uses internal
funds about 8 times more. Splitting by dividend-payments, the picture is very similar
although high-MVC firms tend to draw more on deposits and less on bank finance compared
to the cash holdings-split and investment now is more cash-flow sensitive for the low-MVC
firms.25
Generally, we find that firms with low MVC operate with a financing mix that relies
heavily on internal funds on the margin. High-MVC firms, in contrast, operate with a
marginal financing mix that relies more on external funding (esp. bank loans but also trade
credit). This reveals differences in the marginal cost curves of each financing source for the
firms. Accumulated cash is more valuable for a high-MVC firm on the margin, therefore, it
uses only little cash to make up for a cash flow shortfall—if the firms buffer-stock of cash
is low, it is associated with large costs to draw it down considerably: It may affect future
investment adversely or the risk of financial distress may increase. The marginal cost curve
for bank loans is relatively flatter for high-MVC firms, therefore it makes up for a cash flow
24For high-MVC firms: (18.19+5.48)/4.03=5.87. For low-MVC firms: 44.24/(5.63-4.39)=35.68.
25Notice that the estimated cash flow sensitivity of dividend payments is not zero for the high-MVC group
(with 0 dividends for the given year) in the dividend-split because we are estimating the covariation between
firm demeaned EBITDA and dividends. A firm that pays zero dividends in one year will pay below its average
level in that year and if this occurs in years where EBITDA is also below average, the cash flow sensitivity of
dividends will be positive.
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shortfall by borrowing more. For low-MVC firms, the intuition is the reverse: They may
draw down their cash reserves aggressively without affecting the value of the firm much; i.e.,
the marginal value of cash does not change much even with relatively large movements in
cash holdings. The firm is situated on the flat segment of the marginal value of cash-curve;
confer Figure 1.
Our finding that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is considerably larger for firms with
large cash holdings and, therefore, a lower marginal value of cash, is extremely robust.
It appears in all the regression specifications we use. A similar difference holds for the
payment of dividends.
6.3 Transmission of bank shocks
So far, the estimated cash flow sensitivities tell us little about potential credit constraints
that firms face. Credit constraints affect cash-flow sensitivities but the sensitivities are also
correlated with firms’ investment opportunities, the stochastic process governing firms’
cash flows, etc., and expectations of these. We may, however, deduce the effect of credit
constraints by examining how the cash flow sensitivities change with exogenous shocks to
the supply of external finance. Because we have information about the main bank from
which each firm borrows, we can examine how shocks to a firm’s main bank affect the
financing trade-offs made by the firm.26 In particular, we look at the reaction of the
firm’s cash flow sensitivities in years where its main bank makes relatively large loan loss
provisions. Specifically, our measure of the shock to bank j in year t is the difference
between provisions made in year j and the bank’s average provisions over the sample. Loan
loss provisions lower the equity in the bank and make it harder for banks to expand their
balance sheet though lending and they are therefore likely to respond to high provisions by
26We can observe all the banks a firm borrows from, but the vast majority of the firms in the sample
borrow from just one bank and do not change bank relationship over the sample.
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reducing lending and/or increasing the costs of borrowing.27
In Table 6 we provide summary statistics about the size distribution of the banks in our
sample. Norway has a quite heterogenous bank population with 5-10 nationwide banks,
several of which have been acquired by or merged with foreign banks. The largest of these
banks has a market share of about 30 percent at the end of our sample. In addition, there
is a group of very small, locally-oriented, savings banks and, in between, a large number
of regionally-oriented banks. As can be seen from the table, the bulk of our observations
consists of firms that bank with large or medium sized banks; naturally, the banks that
cover the largest geographical areas are over-represented in this sense. Firms that bank
with small banks make up less than 7 percent of the observations. Importantly, the total
amount of loans to the firms in our sample constitute only a very small fraction (below 5
percent) of their main bank’s loan portfolio. This alleviates concerns one may have about
reverse causality in the bank shock regressions. Loans to households, including mortgage
loans, constitute a large fraction of the loan portfolio for all banks, whereas it is mainly
the largest banks that lend abroad. The table also shows the value of the bank shocks used
in the regressions. On average, it is the largest banks that make above-average provisions
during our sample period, that is, most of the negative shocks to loan supply are found
in this group, whereas the smaller banks have generally made below-average provisions.
Considering the size of the bank shock, not surprisingly, when a small bank experiences a
negative shock, the shock tends to be larger relative to the bank’s loan portfolio.
In the regressions, we include terms where EBITDA is interacted with the measure of
bank shocks, allowing for the shock to provisions to work over two years; that is, we include
measures of bank provisions in year t and year t− 1 which we interact in all combinations
with EBITDAt and EBITDAt−1. We include these lags because investment, as shown, reacts
to cash flows with a lag.
27The costs of borowing should be understood to include all terms of the loan, not just the interest rate.
For example, costs will increase if the bank tightens covenants or collateral requirements.
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In Table 7, we show four sets of results: We split the sample according to firms’ cash
holdings respectively dividend payout and present OLS-estimates in the top panel and IV-
estimates in the bottom panel. In order to limit the number of regressors in the table,
we average some regressors, such that EBITDAt/t−1 ≡ (EBITDAt + EBITDAt−1)/2, and (for
provisions) PROVt/t−1 ≡ (PROVt + PROVt−1)/2.28 The averaging is done for variables that
exert an effect over two periods based on preliminary regressions. The previously discussed
results revealed that, especially, investment adjusts to cash flows over two periods but
also the cash flow sensitivity of loan repayments tends to adjusts to loan loss provisions
over two periods, and this is the reason for focusing on the interaction variable EBITDAt ×
PROVt/t−1. (For completeness, we display regressions without averaging in Appendix A).
Our regressions include time fixed effects so the result are not driven by any particular time
period or nationwide credit contraction.
First we consider the effect of provisions on the level of borrowing. High provisions lead
to less net borrowing (higher net repayment) in the following period: The coefficient to
lagged provisions is 0.71 (OLS) and 1.26 (IV) for the high-MVC group—both are significant
at the 5 percent level while loan-loss provisions have no effect on the low-MVC group.
The interpretation of a coefficient of 0.71 is that if a bank increases loan loss provisions
(relative to total loans) by 1 percentage point, firms decrease the level of loans by an
amount corresponding to 0.71 percent of their total assets. To get a sense of the economic
size of this coefficient, we need to look at the size of a typical bank shock. Figure 2 plots
the distribution of the (absolute value of) bank shocks observed during our sample period
(these shocks are not cleaned of time fixed effects and therefore they differ from the shocks
reported in Table 6). Most shocks are of a size below 1 percent of the bank’s loan portfolio;
hence, the economic effect of a typical shock on firms’ repayment of loans is small. When
banks receive a larger shock of, say, 5 percent it is associated with a almost 4 percent
reduction in the loans-to-asset ratio of the borrowing firms. Considering that the typical
28The variables have firm-, bank-, and time-averages subtracted as explained in the previous section.
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high-MVC firm operates with a loans-to-asset ratio of around 43 percent (Table 4), this is
of significant, but modest, economic size.
Surprisingly, we find a positive relation between contemporaneous net repayment and
provisions—this holds also for the IV-estimations wherefore it is not due to reverse causality.
Possibly this occurs because firms draw on lines of credit but we cannot verify this; however,
such cash hoarding has been documented during the 2008 financial crisis by Ivashina and
Scharfstein (2009). Firms limit dividend pay-out in the same period as higher loan-loss
provisions are observed at their respective main banks.
Turning to cash-flow sensitivities, Table 7 reveals that bank shocks affect the cash flow
sensitivity of loan repayments and investment for high-MVC firms whereas there is no effect
for low-MVC firms. The latter tend to have a fewer loans and are therefore less likely to face
significantly increased cost of lending and they can draw on cash and dividends although
that seems not to happen to a large extent. The results are consistent with banks tightening
standards relatively more for borrowers with a larger amount of outstanding loans.
The cash flow sensitivity of loan repayments interacted with loan-loss provisions av-
eraged over two years (EBITDAt × PROVt/t−1) is –8.77 for the high-MVC group but –1.62
(and insignificantly different from 0) for the low-MVC firms. The economic interpretation
of the coefficient of –8.77, is that if a bank makes loan loss provisions in the order of 1
percentage point of loans (deviation from the bank average and averaged of the current
and previous period) then the net repayment of loans will decline by 8.77 dollars out of a
100 dollars cash flow increase or—maybe more relevant—the firm will draw 8.77 percent
less on loans in the case of a cash flow shortfall. That is, a 1 percentage point increase in
provisions causes an approximately 10 percent reduction in firms’ use of bank finance on
the margin. This is obviously an economic effect of considerable size. The changes in cash
flow sensitivities are significant at the five percent level and they are significantly different
from the corresponding estimates in the low-MVC group at the one and five percent level in
the IV regressions (although the difference is not quite significant at conventional levels in
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the OLS regressions).
Interpreting the results in the light of Figure 1, higher loan-loss provisions steepens the
marginal cost curve of loans for firms with large amounts of loans outstanding and, as a
result, the MVC shifts up significantly for high-MVC firms leading to a higher investment
sensitivity of cash flows. It is natural to expect that firms that face an increase in the
cost of bank finance switch to other sources of finance, for example, internal funds. This,
however, is not what we observe in our sample—there is no effect of bank shocks on the cash
flow sensitivity of cash because high-MVC firms already economize on cash. Rather, it is the
firms’ investments that give. The correlation of investment with firms’ (idiosyncratic) cash
flow goes up and in this sense investment becomes more procyclical. The point estimate is
around 10 for OLS with the interpretation that a 1 percentage point increase in provisions
causes a 10 percent reduction in investment-to-assets in the case of a cash flow shortfall.
The IV estimate is even larger at 27 and is significant but less precisely estimated.
In the IV-specification of Table 7, the marginal cost of trade credit and, to a lesser
extent, the marginal utility of dividends increase in response to bank shocks (the estimated
cash flow sensitivities fall) making firms more reluctant to draw on, especially, trade credit
in bad times. One interpretation could be that in the face of uncertainty over future
access to bank finance, firms prefer not to borrow from expensive non-bank sources fearing
potential difficulties with repayment; alternatively trade credit may become more cyclical
because the firms scale of operation have to follow cash flows more closely. These cash flow
sensitivities are not significant in the OLS-estimation so we hesitate to stress them.
The second part of Table 7 presents OLS- and IV-regressions with the sample split
according to whether firms pay dividends in a given year. The results are in line with
the cash holdings-split, albeit the differences between the high and low-MVC groups are
less significant. The results, however, indicate that bank shocks affect both the cash flow
sensitivities and the level of net loan repayments and investment: Bank finance becomes
more expensive so firms use it less, and as a result, investment falls. Overall, the results
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are very robust to the type of different sample split used.29
6.4 Robustness
Lastly, we check if our results are robust to dynamic panel effects. The lagged levels of the
main variables are included in our regressions and they are correlated with the error terms
through the estimated firm fixed effects when the time dimension is small.
We re-estimate the specifications in Table 7 using the Arellano-Bond Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimator.30 The results (for our variables of interest)
are presented in Table 8. They are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those in
Table 7—hence, our results do not appear to be significantly biased by the presence of
dynamic panel effects.
7 Conclusion
We study the financial, real, and distributive trade-offs made by non-listed, closely-held,
Norwegian firms. Our aim is to understand what determines how much firms rely on
internal or external finance and to what extent firms are willing to trade off financial, real,
and distributive allocations. Our firms are heavily bank dependent and by using data that
link individual firms to their main bank, we examine how these trade-offs are affected by
external bank shocks.
Firms’ marginal value of cash (MVC) is a key determinant of firms’ marginal financing
choices and we show that the sensitivity of the components of the cash flow identity to
firms’ cash flow contains information about how quickly the marginal cost of the different
sources of finance changes as the firm draws on them. By comparing estimated cash flow
29We present the “full” regression specification, without averaging, in Appendix A, Table A-1. Those
results clearly show that the effect of loan provisions on the cash flow sensitivity of loan repayments is
spread out over two periods, as the coefficient on both EBITDAt×PROVt and EBITDAt×PROVt−1 are negative.
The two coefficients are jointly significant. For that reason, we prefer to average the effects and use the
regressor EBITDAt × PROVt/t−1 in the main tables.
30The procedure is available for Stata as xtabond2, written by Roodman (2006).
33
sensitivities for firms with a high MVC to those of firms with a low MVC, we find substantial
differences. High-MVC firms rely fivw-fold more on external (mostly bank) finance to absorb
fluctuations in cash flow whereas low-MVC firms rely eight-fold more on internal finance
(cash) than bank finance.
Low-MVC firms are not affected by shocks to their main bank but high-MVC firms switch
away from bank finance, reflecting that bank finance becomes more expensive. High-MVC
firms, however, do not substitute internal funding for bank loans in the face of bank loan
shocks; rather, investment becomes more dependent on firms’ cash flows.
Our results point to the importance of the marginal value of cash for understanding
firm decision-making and suggest that external finance shocks are transferred to the real
economy via firms’ marginal value of cash.
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Table 1:
Descriptive Statistics: Firm Characteristics
Regression sample
Firm-year obs. 119,682
Firm obs. 21,206
Percent Mean Median Std
Firm age (years) 11 7 2
Largest Owner Share 65 62 6
Turnover (Sales) (thousand kr.) 11,406 6,226 2,616
Total Assets (thousand kr.) 5,520 3,002 1,381
Fixed Assets 37 31 13
Investment in Fixed Assets 7 4 10
Gross Investment 9 7 16
Deposits 14 9 8
Accounts Receivable 20 16 9
Equity 16 17 11
Liabilities 90 88 25
Bank Debt 28 22 12
Accounts Payable 21 16 9
EBITDA 5 4 11
ROA 6 6 10
Dividend 4 2 5
Dividend-Payout 39 24 48
Dividend/EBITDA 27 10 59
The table shows descriptive statistics of the firms in the regression sample. All values, unless indicated
otherwise, are standardized by average firm size (total assets) over the period 1995-2005, reported in percent,
and winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level. Total assets and turnover are reported in thousands of
Norwegian Kroner (NOK). Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s incorporation. Largest owner
is the ownership percent of the largest owner. Turnover (Sales) is total sales. Total Assets is book value of
assets. Fixed Assets is the book value of fixed assets. Investment in Fixed Assets the change in fixed assets.
Gross Investment is the change in fixed assets and inventories plus depreciation. Deposits is the balance
outstanding on accounts in deposit-giving institutions. Accounts Receivable is short-term credit given to
customers (trade credit extended). Equity is book value of equity. Liabilities is the sum of nonfinancial
and financial debt. Bank Debt is loans from commercial and saving banks. Accounts Payable is short-
term debt to creditors (trade credit received). EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation,
and amortization. ROA is the return of total assets. Dividend is the value of dividends to be paid to
shareholders. Dividend Payout is dividend-payments scaled by net income. Dividend/EBITDA is dividend-
payments scaled by EBITDA.
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p
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Table 6:
Descriptive Statistics by Bank Size Group
Bank Size Group Assets
Below 1bn. 1bn – 50bn Above 50bn
Firm-Year Obs. 7,027 56,276 41,273
Percent of Sample 6.7 53.8 39.5
Total Assets (mill.) 669 18,477 264,568
Ratio of Loans to Assets 86.9 88.5 80.9
Ratio of Loans in Sample to All Loans 4.4 3.1 1.5
Ratio of Loans to Households 82.0 67.7 50.7
Ratio of Loans to Foreign Sector 0.3 1.2 8.4
Loan Loss Provisions Shock -0.07 -0.01 0.03
Maximum Shock in Group 2.28 2.35 0.85
The table shows the average (unless otherwise indicated) value of key variables in each bank size group (in
billions of 1998 kroners). Firm-Year Obs. indicates the number of firm-year observations in each subgroup.
Percent of Sample is the share of firm-year observations in percent of the sample. Total Assets is average
bank size in million 1998-kroner. Ratio of Loans to Assets is the size of a bank’s loan portfolio relative to
its assets in percent. Ratio of Loans in Sample to All Loans is the volume of loans held by a bank against
all firms in the sample in percent of its loan portfolio. Ratio of Loans to Households is the percent of banks’
loan portfolio comprised of households loans (incl. mortgages). Ratio of Loans to Foreign Sector is the
percent of banks’ loan portfolio comprising loans to foreign financial institutions, public sector institutions,
households and non-financial firms. Loan Loss Provisions Shock is the value of shocks to loan loss provisions
used in the regressions. A shock is the deviation-from-average provisions measured in percent of a bank’s
loan portfolio. In the regressions, the shock is further demeaned each year across firms due to time fixed
effects, that is, the table displayed the value of the shock across all firms that use a bank in the particular
size group. Maximum Shock in Group is the maximum shock for the banks in each subgroup. Sample:
1995–2005.
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Appendix B
Deriving the cash flow sensitivities
From the identities
s′′∆DEPt =
2drb
dL
∆Lt = f
′′
t It =
U′′t
βU′t+1
∆DIVt ,
we relate the cash flow components to dividends. This delivers an intuitive interpretation
although one could relate to, say, deposits in a similar fashion in the case of zero dividends.
We have βU ′t+1s′′∆DEPt = U′′t ∆DIVt. The right-hand side is the change in marginal utility
of dividends associated with a change in dividends of ∆DIV while the left-hand side is
the change in marginal value of cash associated with a change in deposits of ∆DEPt—this
change is proportional to s′′ which captures how fast the marginal value of cash changes
with deposit balances and, because deposits transfer funds to the next period, it is further
proportional to the discounted marginal utility of dividends in period t+ 1. The marginal
utility of dividends will be equal to the marginal value of cash before the allocation of cash
flows and the marginal utility will equal MVC also after allocation of cash flows, which is why
the change in the marginal values need to be equal. U ′′ is negative and so is s′′, implying
that dividends and deposits will both increase or both decrease as illustrated in Figure 1.
For loans 2βU ′t+1 rb
′
∆Lt = U
′′
t ∆DIV, implying that the change in marginal utility will equal
two times the change in borrowing rate times the change in the stock of loans times βU ′t+1.31
The borrowing rate will increase with borrowing, so rb
′
> 0, and net lending will change in
the opposite direction of dividends as can also be seen from Figure 1. Finally, investment
(the change in the physical capital stock) will satisfy βU ′t+1f ′′It = U ′′t ∆DIVt, with a similar
interpretation. Because the marginal product of capital, f ′, is declining, f ′′ is negative and
the change in the capital stock is of the same sign as the change in dividends.
31The factor 2 occurs because there is an effect on the marginal borrowing rate and because the stock of
loans change. A similar pattern would occur for deposits if there was a change in the deposit rate but this
is not our preferred interpretation of the s function.
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Dividends, deposits, loans, and investments sum (in our approximation) to total cash
flows (“CF”) and expressing all components in terms of dividends using the relations just
discussed, we obtain
∆DIVt +
U′′t
βU′t+1s′′
∆DIV +
U′′t
2βU′t+1 rb
′∆DIV +
U′′t
βU′t+1f ′′
∆DIVt =CFt ,
from which
∆DIVt =
1
1 + U′′t /(βU′t+1s′′) + U′′t /(βU′t+12rb
′
) + U′′t /(βU′t+1f ′′)
CFt .
We observe that the change in dividends paid out is inversely proportional to the second
derivative of the utility function relative to the second derivatives of the costs or benefits
of other sources and uses of funds. This is intuitive, because dividends will increase or
decrease simultaneously with deposits, loans, and capital while keeping marginal utility
equal to marginal product and interest rates. The faster marginal utility changes relative to
those interest rates and marginal product, the less dividends will change while maintaining
the identities. For deposits we obtain
∆DEPt =
1
(βU′t+1 s′′/U′′t + 1 + s′′/2rb
′
+ s′′/f ′′)
CFt ,
which says that deposits adjust in an amount inversely proportional to the rate at which
the marginal shadow interest rate on cash changes compared to the other derivatives.
Similarly, we have
∆Lt =
1
βU′t+1 2rb
′
/U′′t + 2rb
′
/s′′ + 1 + 2rb′/f ′′
CFt .
Again, the change in loan demand is inversely proportional to the (relative) speed at which
the lending rate changes with loans demanded. Finally, we have that gross investment (the
change in capital in our approximation which ignores depreciation) is
It =
1
βU′t+1 f ′′/U′′t + f ′′/s′′ + f ′′/2rb
′
+ 1
CFt .
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Firms adjust capital in an amount inversely proportional to the rate of decline in the
marginal product of capital.
The deterministic model with binding constraint on period t dividends
If the non-negativity constraint for dividends is binding, the Euler equations are replaced
by inequalities. Consider for instance capital. If no dividends are paid out it must be
because the value of the marginal dollar is higher when invested than paid out as dividends
(disregarding the case where the firm utilize the full cash flows for loan repayment). As-
suming dividends in period t+ 1 are non-zero, the “Euler equation” for capital becomes an
inequality
U ′(0) < β U ′(DIVt+1)(1 + f ′(Kt)) .
(To handle the possibility of zero dividends in period t+1 one needs the more general value
function framework sketched in Section 2.) Intuitively, this situation will occur when the
marginal product of capital is relatively high and the MV-curve for dividends is relatively
flat. This may be a state when earnings are low and the firm has few funds (K low and
f ′(K) is a decreasing function in K), or it may arise because the productivity of capital,
f ′(K), is especially high caused by technological or particular market conditions.
Even if dividend payments are zero, the firm can, at the margin, trade off repayment
of loans against investment and in optimum the marginal value of each use will have to
be equal (assuming no non-negativity constraint binds for investments or loans) giving the
equality
βU ′(DIVt+1)(1 + rb + Lt
drb
dL
) = βU′(DIVt+1)(1 + f ′(Kt+1) .
Similarly, a firm can trade off cash holdings against loan repayment and in equilibrium
(ignoring non-negativity constraints for loans) we would have:
βU ′(DIVt+1)(1 + rb + Lt
drb
dL
) = βU′(DIVt+1)(1 + rd + s′(DEPt)) .
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In this case a firm will have a high marginal value of cash in the sense that keeping the
cash within the firm exceed the marginal value of dividend pay-outs and we have:
MVCt ≡ βU′(DIVt+1)(1+rd+s′(DEPt)) = βU′(DIVt+1)(1+rb+Lt dr
b(Lt+1)
dL
) = β(U′(DIVt+1)(1+f ′(Kt)) .
In this setting, the marginal sensitivities of cash will satisfy relations similar to those derived
above, with the difference that the period t marginal utility will not enter the relations.
The situation of zero dividend-payments is illustrated in Figure B-1 below.
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